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Abstract
Despite the success of demand response programs in retail electricity markets in reducing average
consumption, the random responsiveness of consumers to price event makes their efficiency questionable
to achieve the flexibility needed for electric systems with a large share of renewable energy. The variance
of consumers’ responses depreciates the value of these mechanisms and makes them weakly reliable.
This paper aims at designing demand response contracts which allow to act on both the average
consumption and its variance.
The interaction between a risk–averse producer and a risk–averse consumer is modelled through a
Principal–Agent problem, thus accounting for the moral hazard underlying demand response contracts.
The producer, facing the limited flexibility of production, pays an appropriate incentive compensation
to encourage the consumer to reduce his average consumption and to enhance his responsiveness. We
provide closed–form solution for the optimal contract in the case of constant marginal costs of energy
and volatility for the producer and constant marginal value of energy for the consumer. We show
that the optimal contract has a rebate form where the initial condition of the consumption serves as
a baseline. Further, the consumer cannot manipulate the baseline at his own advantage. The first–
best price for energy is a convex combination of the marginal cost and the marginal value of energy
where the weights are given by the risk–aversion ratios, and the first–best price for volatility is the
risk–aversion ratio times the marginal cost of volatility. The second–best price for energy and volatility
are non–constant and non–increasing in time. The price for energy is lower (resp. higher) than the
marginal cost of energy during peak–load (resp. off–peak) periods.
We illustrate the potential benefit issued from the implementation of an incentive mechanism on
the responsiveness of the consumer by calibrating our model with publicly available data. We predict
a significant increase of responsiveness under our optimal contract and a significant increase of the
producer satisfaction.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the use of demand response contracts to achieve flexible power systems. In its com-
mon form, a demand response mechanism is a contract under which the consumer benefits from cheaper
electricity than the standard tariff all the year except at certain peak load periods chosen by the producer
where the price is much higher. These soft mechanisms appear to cumulate the virtues of consumption
reduction while providing substitutes to hardware technologies as chemical batteries or flexible gas–fired
plants. There exist many forms of demand response contracts. For domestic customers, the latter form is
the most common. An alternative form consists in giving a cash premium at the beginning of the year and
then substracting the value of the energy consumed during price events (see Jessoe and Rapson (2014) [29]
for an example). For industrial customers, the payment during price events is indexed on the difference
between the energy consumed compared to the energy they would have consumed if they had not received
any signal, i.e. the baseline consumption. This last form is referred to as Peak–Time Rebate (PTR). It is
known that demand response contracts indexed on the consumer’s baseline are prone to manipulation (see
Chao and De Pillis (2013) [12] in the context of the Baltimore stadium management by Enerwise company
case1 and Hogan (2009,2010) [24, 25], Crampes and Léautier (2015) [14], Brown and Sappington (2016)
[7]).
Moral hazard is a central issue in demand response contracts. Because the consumption during price
event is random, it is not possible to know if the observed consumption has been reduced compared
to what the consumer would have consumed if no price signal had been sent, the latter being non–
observable. The success of a demand response mechanism depends on whether consumers do react on
price events or not. But moral hazard makes it difficult to quantify the responsiveness of a given consumer
or group of consumers, because this quantity is non–observable. This problem has been clearly identified
in experiments but not necessarily connected to a moral hazard factor. For instance, in the context of
the large–scale demand response experiment of Low Carbon London project, Schofield et. al. (2016) [47]
defines responsiveness by a deliberate act made by the consumer to reduce her consumption, a definition
that brings out that responsiveness is the result of the non–observable actions of the consumers.
The moral hazard problem translates in the variance of responses observed in demand response exper-
iments. Consumers do not react to price signal with the discipline of a gas–fired plant. Upon receiving a
price signal, a household may give up the commitment to reduce consumption even if the price is high to
satisfy the constraints of the everyday life (see Torriti (2017) [52] for sociological analysis of households’
energy consumption behaviour). Faruqui and Sergici (2010)’s survey [18] gives an idea of the ex–ante
uncertainty of a demand response program. A sample of 15 dynamic demand response trials shows an
average reduction that ranges between 10% to 50%. Further, again in the Low Carbon London pricing
trial, Carmichael et al. (2014) [10, Section 4.3, Figure 4.9] reports consumer’s reaction to high price event
that ranges from –200 Watt to +200 Watt for a consumption of order of magnitude of 1000 Watt. Mathieu
(2011) [37, Table 6] reports that a furniture store with a peak demand of 1,300 kW reduced on average its
consumption by 78 kW with a standard deviation of 30 kW. The moral hazard problem makes demand
response contract poorly efficient and thus, less valuable than a deterministic substitute.
In this paper, we address the efficiency and design problems of demand response contracts using optimal
contract theory with moral hazard. We show that under certain conditions to be described below, the
optimal contract has a rebate form. Although this form of demand response contract is intensively used in
the economic literature on power systems, it was not shown to our knowledge that it was indeed the optimal
form. The economic literature has focused on the adverse selection problem posed by demand response,
i.e. the fact that consumers may report strategic reduction capacity (see Crampes and Léautier (2015)
1Enerwise was fined a $780.000 penalty by the Federal Energy Regulation Commission 143 FERC 61218 as of June 7th,
2013 for manipulation of a demand response program.
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and also Fahrioglu and Alvarado (2000) [17]) or on the analysis of the first–best case (see Hogan (2010,
2011) [24, 25], Chao (2011) [11] and Brown and Sappington (2016) [7]). Besides, the optimal contract is
baseline–proofness, i.e. not susceptible of artificial increase in the benefit of the consumer in the sense that
whatever the initial condition of the consumption, the consumer gets no more than the reservation utility
he asked for. Furthermore, we show that it is possible and valuable for risk–averse producers to provide
incentives to the consumer to increase the response to price events, i.e. to provide regular responses across
price events or to increase the predictability of the consumption. This result is the implementation of
the simple fact that uncertainty in payments deteriorates the value of a contract for a risk–averse agent.
But, beyond this trivial remark, the problem is how to design a contract that achieves a reduction of
the consumption with a small standard deviation when responsiveness is non–observable? Even though
responsiveness is not observable, we show that indexing the contract on the quadratic variation of the
consumption, which is an observable quantity, provides the desired result of making the consumption
reduction more reliable.
We formulate the mechanism design of demand response programs as a problem optimal contracting
between a producer and a consumer. We focus on one single demand response event with fixed duration.
A risk–averse producer has the obligation to serve the random electricity consumption of a risk–averse
consumer. The producer has a constant marginal cost of energy generation θ and is also subject to a
constant marginal cost of the consumption volatility h. This direct cost of volatility aims to consider the
impact of intermittency on generation costs. The volatility of the consumption is observable and given by
the quadratic variation of the consumption. The consumer has also a constant marginal value of energy
κ. He can reduce the average level of his consumption during the demand response event by curtailing
some activities (washing machine, air conditioning, television and so on). Besides, the consumer can also
decrease the uncertainty on the reduction by showing some discipline in his routine. The costs of actions
on the average reduction and on the regularity of the reduction depend on the corresponding usages of
electricity (lights, oven, air conditioning, television, computer...). A peak–period (resp. off–peak) is a
case when the marginal cost of energy generation is higher (resp. lower) than the marginal value for
the consumer κ ≤ θ (resp. θ ≤ κ). The producer observes the total consumption trajectory and its
quadratic variation but has no access to the consumer’s actions, efforts or consumption per usages. She
aims at finding the optimal contract that minimises the expected disutility from the energy generation
cost, the direct cost of volatility and the incentive payment, while anticipating the optimal response of the
consumer’s maximisation of his expected utility from the payment, the benefit value of his consumption and
the cost of efforts. Finally, the producer’s problem is subject to the consumer’s participation constraint.
The admissible contracts are indexed only on the observed level of consumption and its volatility, and not
on any assumed counterfactual baseline consumption.
We solve the first–best and second–best optimal contracting problems in closed form. We prove that
in both cases, the optimal contract takes the form of a Peak–Time Rebate contract where the initial level
of the consumption serves as a baseline. The consumer is charged the energy he would have consumed if
no efforts were made and then, he is charged or he is paid at a deterministic price the difference between
his realised consumption and its initial value. In the limiting case where the consumer is risk–neutral, the
second–best contract achieves the first–best optimum, as it is usual in optimal contract theory with moral
hazard. In this case, the consumer is charged for the energy at the marginal cost of energy and for the
volatility at the direct marginal cost of volatility. Furthermore, the price of volatility is simply a share of
the direct cost of volatility, where the share is the relative risk aversion of the producer compared to the
consumer.
Apart from this limiting case, the risk–sharing process leads to charging the consumer at energy
and volatility prices different from their marginal costs. In the first–best situation, the price of energy
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is a convex combination of the energy marginal value for the consumer and the marginal cost of the
producer. The weights are given by the risk–ratios. During peak–periods, the price paid is higher than
the marginal value of energy for the consumer, providing thus an incentive to reduce his consumption.
During off–periods, the price paid is lower than this marginal value and thus, provides no incentives to
reduce consumption.
During peak periods, the producer induces efforts to reduce the average consumption and to increase
responsiveness. The incentive prices are no longer equal to the marginal cost of energy and volatility.
They depend on the costs of effort of the consumer. The second–best price for energy is non–constant and
non–linear even in the case of constant marginal cost and value of energy. It is a decreasing function of
time that induces more effort in the beginning of the period than at the end. Still in peak time periods,
the second–best contract fails to achieve the first–best optimum. This is because the second–best contract
fails to achieve an optimal coordination of the reduction of consumption and the reduction of volatility.
Inducing a reduction of the volatility influences the payment for the reduction of consumption. The first–
best contracting does not suffer from this constraint. The first–best contracting can separate the induced
observed efforts and the prices for reduction and thus can achieve a better coordination. The consumer
enjoys an information rent, which is an increasing function of the volatility of his consumption. During
off–peak periods, the producer induces effort only on responsiveness and achieves first–best value by the
implementation of second–best optimal contracting. First–best and second–best prices are equal while
prices for volatility differ.
Our result provides rationality for considering only rebate contracts when assessing the appropriate
introduction of demand response mechanisms in a market. But, it also appears that, from a theoretical
point of view, the design of efficient incentive policies to foster consumer’s demand response cannot solely
rely on the marginal cost of electricity of the producer — as proposed by the FERC in Order n. 719 —, or
only on the difference between this marginal cost and the value paid by the consumer. These incentives are
proxies for the optimal contract. But the second–best optimal contract should also consider the disutility
incurred by the consumer for his efforts to induce the reduction, as well as the risk the consumer takes.
We stress that this result applies even when there are no responsiveness incentives implemented. In this
case, the closed–form expression of the energy price embeds the costs of effort of the consumer.
We also find that, under the optimal contract, the resulting consumption volatility may decrease as
required, but it may also increase depending on the risk aversion parameters of both actors. Because he
is risk–averse, the consumer has a natural incentive to reduce the consumption volatility, even without
contract. Thus, before contracting one could observe a lower level of consumption volatility than the
no–effort situation. After contracting, if the producer’s volatility cost is small enough, or if she is much
less risk–averse than the consumer, she would accept the volatility risk and thus, allow the consumer to
avoid making costly effort to reduce volatility. This result illustrates how the risk sharing process between
the producer and the consumer allows the electric system to bear more risk.
Only experiments could quantify the benefits of responsiveness incentives claimed in this paper. Nev-
ertheless, we illustrate the potential benefit from such a mechanism design by using the Low Carbon
London data to provide quantitative estimates. We calibrate the parameters of our model by interpreting
this experiment as the implementation of our optimal contracting model under no responsiveness incen-
tives, i.e. the consumer is only incentivised to reduce the average level of his consumption. We find
an important consumption volatility reduction and a significant increase of the producers benefit for a
small increase of the cost of efforts from the consumer. We examine the robustness of this result to the
assumption of constant marginal costs and value of energy. We implement a numerical approximation of
the solution of the optimal contracting problem for a concave consumer’s energy value function, and we
perform the comparison with the corresponding linear contract approximation. We find that the concavity
of the energy value function of the consumer has a downward effect on the benefit of the producer. The
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linear approximation of the energy value function exacerbates this downward effect for strongly concave
functions. Further, because it may not be necessarily easy to explain to domestic consumers an incentive
mechanism based on the quadratic variation of their consumption, we propose simplified alternatives for
the design of new experiments.
Our model stands at the intersection of optimal contract theory in continuous-time, the economics
of demand response for power systems and their empirical implications. From a methodological point of
view, our work falls in the line of the works of Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1979) [26], Grossman and Hart
(1983) [21], Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1987) [27] and Sannikov (2008) [45]. Our results rely on the recent
advances of Cvitanić et al. (2018) [15] which allows for volatility control (i.e. responsiveness effort) in the
continuous time Principal Agent problem. For an economic introduction to incentives theory, we refer to
Laffont and Martimort (2002) [34]. The economic literature on optimal contract theory and risk-sharing
is vast. We also refer to Cadellinas et al. (2007) [9], who present a general setting for the analysis of the
first–best optimal risk–sharing in the context of compensation plan for executives, and to Müller (1998)
[39] who provides the first–best optimal sharing rule in the case of CARA exponential utility function and
shows that it is also a linear function of the aggregated output as in the second–best case. The closest
work on volatility control in the framework of Principal–Agent is in Cvitanić et al. (2017) [16], however
our paper is the first to produce a closed form solution in this context.
Regarding demand response programs, their study is a long–dated subject in the economic literature,
see Tan and Varaiya (1993) [50] for a seminal model of interruptible contracts for a pool of consumers. The
framework of optimal contract theory has been used to formulate the enrolment of customers in demand
response programs as an adverse selection program. This idea can be traced back to the work of Fahrioglu
and Alvarado (2000) [17] on incentive compatible demand response program and has been recently reused
both in the work of Crampes and Léautier (2015) [14] to design suitable base–line consumption reference,
and by Alasseur et al. (2017) [2] for peak–load pricing. More recently, big data methods have been used to
provide precise response of consumers with a given probability, see Kwac and Rajagopal (2014) [33]. The
only known work to the authors modeling the cost of electricity demand volatility is Tsitsiklis and Xu (2015)
[53] who designed a model in discrete–time where they consider not only the generation cost of energy
but also the cost of variation of generation between two–time steps. In their model, consumers are incited
to reduce their consumption with a price signal which is the traditional marginal fuel cost of generation
plus the marginal of cost of variation of generation. The complexity of the model in terms of represented
constraints only allows for numerical simulations. Further, our work contributes to the empirical literature
on moral hazard models, see Chiappori and Salanié (2000) [13] for insurance industry, Lewis and Bajari
(20014) [35] for public procurement and Bandiera et al. (2005) [3] for workers’ productivity. We make the
testable prediction that the implementation of responsiveness incentives decreases consumption volatility.
This claim can be tested by the next generation of demand response pricing trials by performing controlled
experiments to compare consumers with and without responsiveness incentives as described in our work.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides the first–best, the
second–best optimal contract and the optimal contract when no incentives on responsiveness is provided.
Section 4 provides empirical results. Section 4.4 gives practical ways to implement a responsiveness
incentive scheme. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Before formulating our model in precise mathematical terms, we describe its main features and explain its
underlying assumptions. We consider a single producer who has obligation–to–serve the electricity demand
of a single residential consumer enjoying a flat retail rate. This situation captures the main regulatory
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barrier to price–responsive demand (see Chao (2011) [11]). The producer wonders if it is interesting or not
to propose to the consumer a demand response contract to incite him to change his consumption during
a given period [0, T ]. It might be more efficient during peak period to pay the consumer to reduce his
consumption rather than deploy costly generation power plants. Besides potential energy consumption
reduction, the producer wonders if it is interesting to incite the consumer to provide a more predictable
consumption during the price event. A highly random consumption induces adjustment costs that could
be avoided if the consumer exhibits a more regular consumption pattern. Further, a highly random
consumption reduction from one price event to another reduces the value of the contract as it increases
the uncertainty of the payments to or from the consumer. Thus, the concern of the producer is to propose
a contract of demand response that would allow her to avoid high generation cost and make the consumer
more predictable. Nevertheless, the producer is facing a moral–hazard problem. Once the demand response
contract is signed, when the price event occurs, he may change his mind and prefer to consume rather
than make the costly efforts of reduction. Because the producer only observes the consumption and not
the actions of the consumer in his house, it is not possible to infer if a consumption level is the result of
efforts or just chance.
We focus on one single demand response event with fixed duration, making the hypothesis that all
successive demand response events exhibit the same characteristics. This is genuinely the case in electricity
industry, all demand response events share the same price structure. The timing of the operation is the
following. At time zero, the producer proposes a paying rule for demand response, knowing the reservation
utility of the consumer; at time one, the consumer accepts or rejects the contract; if the consumer accepts
the contracts, then, later, the demand response event occurs, the producer measures in continuous–time
the consumption and provides the payment (positive or negative) at the end of the event.
The consumption of the consumer is the sum of the consumption of different usages. The consumer
values in monetary terms the electricity he can consume. Although it is more realistic to consider that
the marginal value of each kWh is decreasing, we consider a constant marginal value of energy. The
case of strictly concave energy value function is provided in the Appendix of the paper, but we focus on
the constant marginal case where the results are explicit. The consumer can achieve a reduction of his
consumption by taking costly actions. The actions are differentiated per usage. They consist in reducing
or not the usage of each electric devices. These actions are costly in a sense that they may call for the
usage of substitutes to achieve the same level of comfort. In times of demand response event during winter,
households may use gas stoves or other heating devices. Instead of cooking the lunch and the dinner on
the electric cooking range, they may use a camping gas stove. The consumer can also achieve regularity
in his responses to the producer sollicitations by disciplining his consumption usages. Once the consumer
has received the demand response signal, he decides the timing of his consumption and tries to stick to
it. During the price event, random events occur that may drive away the consumer from his planned
consumption pattern if no actions are taken to dampen their effects (kids coming back from school with
friends, sudden drop of outside brightness...). This a way we can understand the control of the volatility of
the consumption. The mitigation of the random events that occur during the price event would result in a
lower volatility of the consumption which can be measured by its quadratic variation. In our setting, the
responsiveness of the consumer is the unobservable actions he takes to reduce the impact of his daily life
events on his consumption. In this way, we capture the fact that when the producer observes a reduction,
it is not possible to determine surely if it is the result of voluntary actions of the consumer or if it is by
chance. Of course, the higher the discipline of the consumer, the higher the cost. Indeed, the consumer
must make a compromise between the consumption pattern he wants to stick to and the random events
of everyday life. Reducing consumption and mitigating the effects of random events on a consumption
pattern are two separate phenomena. A consumer could exhibit a high level of consumption but still be
responsive if he sticks to a regular pattern of consumption. The cost function for consumption reduction
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and for responsiveness increase is supposed to be strictly convex. We specify a parametric form that
captures convexity and separation of reduction and responsiveness cost that allows quantitative estimates.
On her side, the producer bears two kind of costs: generation cost to meet consumption of the con-
sumer on real–time basis and direct consumption volatility cost. The marginal generation cost is assumed
constant. This assumption does not properly reflect the high volatility of electricity prices but it captures
the Time–Of–Use tariffs which provide one price during peak period and another for off–peaks. The direct
consumption volatility cost represents the costs induced by the non–predictable part of the consumption.
There is quite a literature on the assessment of the direct and indirect costs induced by the massive in-
troduction of intermittent renewable energy. For a review of this topic, we refer to Hirth (2015) [23] and
Strbac et. al. (2007) [49]. There is a consensus on the fact that the extra–generation cost is an increasing,
probably strictly convex function of the volatility of the renewable energy sources. In our setting, we limit
ourselves to a constant marginal cost of consumption volatility.
Furthermore, both the producer and the consumer are supposed to be risk–averse. The producer is
risk–averse because the obligation to serve the consumer’s demand is not associated with the possibility
to transfer to the consumer all the risks involved with the uncertain generation costs. Besides, there
is not necessarily a diversification effect in the aggregation of demand response across many consumers
that would lead to compensation of errors. Indeed, large scale demand response event still exhibit a
significant variance of consumption across price events. On their side, consumers are reluctant to engage
in demand response contract because they fear unexpected high bill due to their uncertain capacity to
reduce consumption during price event. For instance, in the case of the Low Carbon London experiment,
the enrolled consumers were paid 100 £ at the beginning of the trial and 50 £ more if they completed all
the trial and were assured not to lose any money because of the form of their contracts. We shall take for
both actors an exponential utility function. This utility is known to exhibit independence with respect to
initial wealth. Although there exists evidence that the risk–aversion of consumers decreases with wealth,
the hypothesis of initial wealth independence is an acceptable approximation in the context of demand
response contract where only a small fraction of the total income of the consumer is involved.
2.1 The consumer
The Agent consumption process is denoted by X = {Xt, t ∈ [0, T ]}, and is the canonical process of the
space Ω of scalar continuous trajectories ω : [0, T ] −→ R, i.e. Xt(ω) = ω(t) for all (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω. We
denote by F = {Ft, t ∈ [0, T ]} the corresponding filtration. A control process for the consumer (the Agent)
is a pair ν := (α, β) of F−adapted processes, which are respectively A− and B−valued. More specifically,
α represents the effort of the consumer to reduce the level of consumption and β is the responsiveness
effort consisting in reducing the consumption variability for each usage of electricity. We emphasise that α
and β are respectively N− and d−dimensional vectors, thus capturing the differentiation between different
usages, e.g. refrigerator, heating or air conditioning, lightning, television, washing machine, computers...
This set of control processes is denoted by U .
For a given initial condition X0 ∈ R, representing the consumption at the beginning of the price
event, and some control process ν := (α, β), the controlled equation is defined by the following stochastic
differential equation2 driven by a d−dimensional Brownian motion W
Xt = X0 −
∫ t
0
αs · 1ds+
∫ t
0
σ(βs) · dWs, t ∈ [0, T ], with σ(b) := (σ1
√
b1, . . . , σd
√
bd)
>, (2.1)
for some given parameters σ1, . . . , σd > 0. All of our utility criteria depend only on the distribution Pν of
the state process X corresponding to the effort process ν. Let P be the collection of all such measures Pν .
2For technical reasons, we need to consider weak solutions of the stochastic differential equations. However, for expositional
purposes, we deliberately ignore this technical aspect in this section so as to focus on the main message of the present paper.
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The state variable X represents the consumer’s consumption. An effort ν induces a separable cost
c(ν) := c1(α) +
1
2c2(β) and a value f(X) from the consumption X. Throughout this paper, we shall take
c1(a) :=
1
2
N∑
i=1
a2i
µi
, and c2(b) :=
d∑
j=1
σ2j
λj
(
b−1j − 1
)
, a ∈ A, b ∈ B,
for some (µ, λ) ∈ (0,+∞)N × (0,+∞)d. Notice that c is convex, increasing in a and decreasing in b as the
responsiveness effort consists in reducing the volatility, thus reproducing the requested effects of increasing
marginal cost of effort. Moreover, c1(0) = c2(1) = 0 captures the fact that there is no cost for making no
effort. The cost function is quadratic in a, and illustrates that small deviations (as e.g. switching off the
light when leaving some place) are painless, while large deviations (as e.g. reducing the consumption from
heating or air conditioning) are more costly. The function f is taken to be linear f(x) = κx. Results are
provided in the Appendices A.1, A.2 and A.3 for a general increasing value function f .
The Agent controls the electricity consumption by choosing the effort process ν in the state equation
(2.1), subject to the corresponding cost of effort rate c(ν), and the consumption value rate f(X). For
technical reasons, we need to consider bounded efforts, we then set
A :=
[
0, µ1Amax
]× · · · × [0, µNAmax] and B := [ε, 1],
for some constants Amax > 0 and ε > 0.
The execution of the contract starts at t = 0. The consumer receives the value ξ from the producer at
time T . The value ξ can be positive (payment) or negative (charge). The producer has no access to the
consumer’s actions, and does not observe the consumer’s different usages of electricity. She only observes
the overall consumption X. Consequently, the compensation ξ can only be contingent on X, that is ξ is
FT−measurable. We denote by C the set of FT−measurable random variables. The objective function of
the consumer is then defined for all (ν, ξ) ∈ U × C by
JA(ξ,Pν) := EP
ν
[
UA
(
ξ +
∫ T
0
(
f(Xs)− c(νs)
)
ds
)]
, where UA(x) := −e−rx, (2.2)
for some constant risk aversion parameter r > 0. It is implicitly understood that the limiting case where
r tends to zero corresponds to a risk–neutral consumer.
The consumer’s problem is
VA(ξ) := sup
Pν∈P
JA(ξ,Pν), (2.3)
i.e. maximising utility from consumption subject to the cost of effort. A control Pν̂ ∈ P will be called
optimal if V A(ξ) = JA
(
ξ,Pν̂
)
. We denote by P?(ξ) the collection of all such optimal responses Pν̂ . We
finally assume that the consumer has a reservation utility R0 ∈ R−. We denote by L0 := −1r log (−R0),
the certainty equivalent of the reservation utility of the consumer for the consumer.
2.2 The producer
The producer (the Principal) provides electricity to the consumer, and thus faces the generation cost of
the produced energy, and the cost induced by the variation of production. Her performance criterion is
defined by
JP(ξ,Pν) := EP
ν
[
U
(
− ξ −
∫ T
0
g(Xs)ds− h
2
〈X〉T
)]
, with U(x) := −e−px. (2.4)
Here p > 0 is the constant absolute risk aversion parameter, g is taken to be linear g(x) = θx. Results
are provided in the Appendices for general non–decreasing generation cost function. The parameter h is
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a positive constant representing the direct marginal cost induced by the quadratic variation 〈X〉 of the
consumption. The higher the volatility of the consumption, the more costly it is for the producer to follow
the load curve. Note that due to risk–aversion, the producer bears also an indirect cost of volatility.
An FT−measurable random variable ξ will be called a contract, which we denote by ξ ∈ C, if it satisfies
the additional integrability property
sup
Pν∈P
EP
ν [
e−rmξ
]
+ sup
Pν∈P
EP
ν [
epmξ
]
< +∞, for some m > 1. (2.5)
This integrability condition guarantees that the consumer’s criterion (2.2) and the principal one (2.4) are
well-defined.
Throughout this paper, we shall consider the two following standard contracting problems.
• First best contracting corresponds to the benchmark situation where the producer has full power to
impose a contract to the consumer and to dictate the Agent’s effort
V fb := sup
(ξ,Pν)∈C×P
{
JP(ξ,Pν) : JA(ξ,Pν) ≥ R0
}
, (2.6)
• Second best contracting allows the consumer to respond optimally to the producer’s offer. We follow
the standard convention in the Principal–Agent literature in the case of multiple optimal responses
in P?(ξ), that the consumer implements the optimal response that is the best for the producer. This
leads to the second best contracting problem
V sb := sup
ξ∈Ξ
sup
Pν∈P?(ξ)
JP(ξ,Pν), where Ξ :=
{
ξ ∈ C : VA(ξ) ≥ R0
}
, (2.7)
with the convention sup ∅ = −∞, thus restricting the contracts that can be offered by the producer
to those ξ ∈ C such that P?(ξ) 6= ∅.
2.3 Consumer’s optimal response and reservation utility
We collect here some calculations related to the consumer’s optimal response which will be useful through-
out the paper. Following Cvitanić et al. (2018) [15], we introduce the consumer’s Hamiltonian.
H(z, γ) := Hm(z) +Hv(γ), z, γ ∈ R, (2.8)
where Hm and Hv are the components of the Hamiltonian corresponding to the instantaneous mean and
volatility, respectively
Hm(z) := − inf
a∈A
{
a · 1z + c1(a)
}
, and Hv(γ) := −1
2
inf
b∈B
{
c2(b)− γ|σ(b)|2
}
. (2.9)
Here, z represents the payment rate for a decrease of the consumption and γ represents the payment rate
for a decrease of the volatility of the consumption. Both payment rates can be positive or negative. Given
these payments, the consumer maximises the instantaneous rate of benefit given by the Hamiltonian to
deduce the optimal response â(z) on the drift and b̂(γ) on the volatilities. The following result collects
the closed–form expression of the optimal responses. We denote x− := 0 ∨ (−x), x ∈ R.
Proposition 2.1. (Consumer’s best–response) The optimal response of the consumer to an instantaneous
payment rate (z, γ) is
âj(z) := µj(z
− ∧Amax), and b̂j(γ) := (1 ∧ (λjγ−)− 12 ) ∨ ε, j = 1, . . . , N,
so that, with µ¯ := µ · 1, σ̂(γ) := σ(b̂(γ)), ĉ1(z) := c1(â(z)), and ĉ2(γ) := c2(b̂(γ)),
Hm(z) =
1
2
µ¯
(
z− ∧Amax
)2 and Hv(γ) = −1
2
(
ĉ2(γ)− γ
∣∣σ̂(γ)∣∣2).
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The z payment induces an effort of the consumer on all usages to reduce the average consumption
deviation and this effort is inversely proportional to its cost 1/µi. The γ payment induces an effort only
on the usages whose cost 1/λj is lower than the payment. As a first use of the previous notations, we
provide the following characterisation of the consumer’s behaviour without contract.
Proposition 2.2. (Consumer’s behaviour without contract) Let f(x) = κx, x ∈ R, for some κ ≥ 0.
Then, VA(0) = UA(`0) where `0 = κX0T + E0(T ) and
E0(T ) :=
∫ T
0
Hv
(− γ(t))dt, and γ(t) := −rκ2(T − t)2.
The consumer’s optimal effort on the drift and on each volatility usage are respectively
a0 = 0, and b0j (t) := ε ∨ (1 ∧
(
λj |γ(t)|
)− 1
2 ), j = 1, . . . , d,
thus inducing an optimal distribution P0 under which the deviation process follows the dynamics dXt =
σ̂
(
b0(t)
) · dWt, for some P0−Brownian motion W .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
3 Main results
We consider the case where
(f − g)(x) := δx, x ∈ R. (3.1)
for some constant parameter δ := κ − θ, called hereafter energy value discrepancy. The case δ ≥ 0
corresponds to off–peak hours while negative δ corresponds to peak–load hours.
3.1 First–best contract
Proposition 3.1. (First–best contract) Let (f − g)(x) = δx. Then:
(i) the first–best value function is given by
V fb = U(v¯(0, X0)− L0) where v¯(t, x) = δ(T − t)x+
∫ T
t
mfb(s)ds,
and
mfb(t) :=
1
2
µ¯(δ−)2(T − t)2 +Hv
(− h− ρδ2(T − t)2), ρ := rp
r + p
.
(ii) The consumer’s optimal effort is given by
afb(t) := µδ
−(T − t), and bfb(t) := 1 ∧
(
λj(h+ ρ δ
2(T − t)2)
)− 1
2
,
thus inducing an optimal distribution Pfb under which the deviation process follows the dynamics dXt =
−µδ−(T − t) · 1dt+ σ(bfb(t)) · dWt, for some Pfb−Brownian motion W .
(iii) The optimal first–best contract is given by:
ξfb = L0 − κX0T +
∫ T
0
c(νt)dt+
∫ T
0
piefb
(
X0 −Xt
)
dt− 1
2
∫ T
0
pivfbd〈X〉t,
where
piefb :=
r
r + p
κ+
p
r + p
θ, pivfb :=
p
r + p
h.
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Proof: See Appendix A.2. 
The first–best contract admits the form of a rebate contract: the consumer is paid his certainty
equivalent reservation utility minus the average value of the energy he would consume if no effort is made
(κTX0)
ξffb := L0 − κTX0,
and then, a variable payment consisting on the cost of his efforts, which are observable and enforced in
the first–best, plus a part proportional to the difference between X0 and a charge for volatility variation
ξvfb :=
∫ T
0
c(νt)dt+
∫ T
0
piefb
(
X0 −Xt
)
dt− 1
2
∫ T
0
pivfbd〈X〉t.
This form is a rebate contract where X0 serves as baseline.
If the consumer is risk–neutral, the first–best contract transfers all the uncertainty of the generation
cost to the consumer as it is standard in the moral hazard optimal contract framework. The first–best
price for energy is simply the weighted sum by their risk–aversion of the energy values for the consumer
and the producer. The first–best price for the responsiveness is a constant fraction of the direct cost of
volatility if the consumer is risk–averse and it is constant. As a consequence, we see that a contract that
would be indexed only on the information of the cost function of the producer is optimal only in the case
when the consumer is risk–neutral. The economic intuition that the marginal cost of generation triggers
a socially optimal response is correct only if the consumer is risk–neutral. If not, the consumers needs a
compensation payment for the risk he takes in the contract.
Regarding the induced behaviour of the consumer on the volatilities, reduction is performed only on
those usage for which the marginal cost of effort measured by 1/λj is lower than the marginal cost of
volatility for the producer measured by h+ ρδ2(T − t)2. It is only in the cases where the producer or the
consumer is risk–neutral or if they agree on the energy value (δ = 0) that responsiveness is triggered by
the mere comparison of h and the λj .
3.2 Second–best contract
Proposition 3.2. (Second–best contract) Let (f − g)(x) = δx. Then:
(i) the producer’s second–best value function is given by V sb = U
(
v(0, X0)−L0
)
, with certainty equiv-
alent function
v(t, x) = δ(T − t)x+
∫ T
t
msb(s)ds,
where
msb(t) :=
1
2
µ¯δ2(T − t)2 − 1
2
inf
z∈R
{
µ¯(z− + δ(T − t))2 − 2Hm
(− q(z))}.
where q(z) := h+ rz2 + p(z − δ(T − t))2.
(ii) The optimal payment rates are the deterministic functions
zsb(t) = Argmin
z∈R
{
µ¯(z− + δ(T − t))2 − 2Hm
(− q(z))}, and γsb(t) = −q(zsb(t)).
(iii) the second–best optimal contract is given by ξsb = ξfsb + ξvsb where
ξfsb := L0 − κTX0 −
∫ T
0
H(zsb, γsb)(t)dt, ξ
v
sb :=
∫ T
0
piesb(t)
(
X0 −Xt
)
dt− 1
2
∫ T
0
pivsb(t)d〈X〉t,
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and
piesb(t) := κ+ z
′
sb(t), pi
v
sb(t) := h+ p
(
zsb(t)− δ(T − t)
)2
.
(iv) The induced dynamics of the consumption reduction is
dXt = −â(zsb(t))dt+ σ̂(γsb(t)) · dWt,
for some Psb−Brownian motion W
Proof. See Appendix A.3
Similar to the first–best case, the second–best optimal contract has the form of a rebate contract. But,
in the fixed part payment, the producer no longer charges the real cost of the consumer’s effort, which is
not observable, but the net benefit of his optimal efforts. In peak periods, the second–best payment rates
are obtained up to a scalar optimisation (Proposition 3.2 (ii)). If the consumer is risk–neutral, we can
obtain that:
ξvsb =
∫ T
0
θ(X0 −Xt)dt− 1
2
∫ T
0
h d〈X〉t.
The optimal prices are the marginal costs of energy and volatility. Apart from this limiting case, the
optimal price for energy is non–constant, and non–linear (see Section 4 for illustration).
We have seen in the Introduction that demand response contracts written in rebate form are susceptible
of baseline manipulation. If we define baseline manipulation as an artificial increase of the baseline
consumption to obtain a higher utility, then the optimal contract given in Proposition 3.2 does not suffer
from this drawback when the consumer’s reservation utility is expressed in absolute terms. In this case,
whatever the initial consumption level X0 used as a baseline, the consumer gets no more than the certainty
equivalent L0 is asked for.
During off–peak periods, it is possible to obtain more explicit result for Proposition 3.2.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose. (f − g)′ = δ ≥ 0. Then:
(i) the optimal payments rate are deterministic functions of time given by
zsb(t) =
p
r + p
δ(T − t), and γsb(t) = −h− ρ δ2(T − t)2
and the second–best optimal contract of Proposition 3.2 (iii) is defined by the constant prices
piesb :=
r
r + p
κ+
p
r + p
θ, pivsb := h+ ρ
r
r + p
δ2(T − t)2.
(ii) the consumer’s optimal effort on the drift and the volatility of the consumption deviation is
â
(
zsb
)
= 0, and b̂j
(
γsb
)
= 1 ∧
(
λjγsb(t)
)− 1
2
,
so that the optimal response of the consumer induces the optimal probability distribution Psb such that
dXt = σ̂(γsb) · dWt, for some Psb−Brownian motion W .
Proof. (ii) Applying Proposition 3.1 and Proposition A.4 (iii) to the case where δ ≥ 0 gives directly that
zsb =
p
r+pvx =
p
r+pδ(T − t) and thus γsb follows. Further, applying Proposition A.4 (iv) together with the
expression of zsb gives directly ξsb. (iii) The application of Proposition 2.1 gives the result. Collecting
the former results together with Proposition 3.1 (i) and our guess, gives the expression of V sb in (i).
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In off–peak periods, the price for energy is lower than its value for the consumer κ. Thus, the consumer
has no incentives to sell at piesbm a good that is worth κ for him. The consumption is a martingale.
Nevertheless, the payment rate on the drift zsb(t) is positive and not zero, as one would have expected.
The producer is paying the consumer when the consumption increases. While this finding seems to be in
contradiction with the producer’s objective, it is explained as follows. The payment rate for the volatility
is γsb(t) + rz2sb(t) = h+ p(zsb(t)− δ(T − t))2 + rz2sb(t), and thus, it depends on the payment rate on the
drift. Taking zsb ≡ 0 is not optimal. The producer is better off paying an increase of consumption at a
price higher than her marginal cost in exchange for a greater decrease of the volatility.
Regarding the price of volatitity, we note that it is higher than its direct marginal cost for the producer
and that is not constant. The producer requires more effort at the begining of the period than at the end.
Further, the risk–sharing process between the producer and the consumer may lead to an increase in
the observed volatility of consumption. To see that, consider the limiting case where δ = 0 and h = 0.
Then, the optimal payment γsb is zero which means that the producer does not provide responsiveness
incentives, even if both players are risk–averse. In this situation, the observed volatility is equal to the
nominal volatility. But, it might happen that this quantity is greater than the observed volatility before
contracting. If the consumer is sufficiently risk–averse, he might have performed some efforts to reduce
the nominal volatility. In fact, there is a large set of parameters value for which the producer is taking the
volatility risk for the consumer. From a risk–sharing point of view, this means that optimal contracting
allows the system to bear more risk. This phenomenom is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: (Left) Total volatility of consumption deviation under optimal contract as a function of the
direct volatility cost h and the risk-aversion parameter p of the consumer compared to the total volatility
without contract (flat surface). (Right) Certainty equivalent of the producer with contract and without
contract as a function of the direct volatility cost h and the risk-aversion parameter p. parameters value:
two usages, T = 1, µ = (2, 5), σ = (5, 2), λ = (0.5, 0.1), κ = 5, δ = 3.
Figure 1 shows the variation of the observed total volatility of consumption deviation and the benefit
from the contract as a function of the direct marginal cost of volatility h and the risk–aversion parameter
of the producer p when δ > 0. For a risk neutral producer with zero marginal direct cost of volatility,
the producer requires no effort from the consumer and the volatility is equal to the nominal volatility.
For a risk neutral producer with increasing direct marginal cost of volatility, we observe that volatility
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remains constant until the value of h gets higher than a certain threshold, namely the lower cost of effort
for volatility reduction of the consumer. Then, the producer starts to require an effort from the consumer.
Then, the higher the value of h, the lower the observed volatility until an effort is required that reduces the
volatility below its value before contracting. If we fix the value of h and make the producer increasingly
risk averse, we also observe a progressive yet slower reduction of volatility because the indirect cost of
volatility is much lower than its direct cost. Further, we observe that the gain from the contract is a
non–decreasing function of p but a non-monotonic function of h. Indeed, even if the benefit from the
contract is always positive, the producer who has a small direct marginal cost does not induce any effort
from the consumer and thus, cannot reap any increased benefit from the behaviour of the consumer.
3.3 Comparisons
In order to assess the benefits from responsiveness incentives, we consider the situation where the producer
does not provide incentives on the responsiveness of the consumer, although he could reduce his consump-
tion’s volatility if properly incentivised. We consider the problem (2.7) of the producer where the contracts
are limited to incentives indexed on the observed consumption and not on its volatility. Proposition 3.2
in Appendix A.3 gives a precise meaning of this sub–class of contracts. We denote by V sbm the value of
the producer’s problem in this case. In this situation, the behaviour of the consumer without contracting
is still given by Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 3.3 (Second–best without responsiveness incentives). Assume that f − g = δx. Then:
(i) V sbm = U
(
w(0, X0)− L0
)
where
w(t, x) = δ(T − t)x+
∫ T
t
msbm(s)ds,
and
msbm(t) :=
1
2
µ¯δ2(T − t)2 − 1
2
{
q(zsbm)|σ|2 + µ¯(z−sbm + δ(T − t))2
}
,
with q(z) := h+ rz2 + p(z − δ(T − t))2.
(ii) the second–best optimal payment rate is zsbm(t) = Λδ(T − t) with Λ := p|σ|
2+µ¯1{δ<0}
(p+r)|σ|2+µ¯1{δ<0} .
(iii) the second–best optimal contract is given by ξsbm = ξfsbm + ξ
v
sbm where
ξfsbm = L0 − κTX0 +
1
2
∫ T
0
rz2sbm(t)|σ|2dt−
∫ T
0
Hm(zsbm(t))dt, ξ
v
sbm =
∫ T
0
piesbm
(
X0 −Xt
)
dt,
and the price for energy piesb and the price for volatility pivsbm are given by:
piesbm := (1− Λ)κ+ Λθ, pivsbm := 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
The price for energy is still a weighted sum of the value of energy for the consumer and the producer.
Besides, we have:
piefb − piesbm := (Λ−
p
r + p
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
δ.
During off–peak period (δ > 0), the second–best price is lower than the first–best optimum. During
peak–load period, the producer pays or charges a price greater than what is socially optimal.
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We turn now to the measure of the welfare loss due to the information rent of the consumer because of his
hidden actions. Define the informational rent as I := −1p log
(
V fb
V sb
)
. The proof of the following Proposition
giving the value of the information is found in Appendix A.5.
Proposition 3.4. (Comparisons) Assume that f − g = δx. Then: (i) If δ ≥ 0, then there is no informa-
tional rent, I = 0 and ξsb = ξfb.
(ii) When δ ≤ 0 and h+ rδ2T 2 ≤ 1
λ¯
, the informational rent is
I =
δ2T 3r2
6(p+ r)
1
1
|σ|2 +
p+r
µ¯
.
During off–peak period, there is no information rent. In this case, in terms of volatility reduction,
the optimal contract implements the same efforts as would do the social planner. In this situation, the
producer has only one objective to achieve, reducing the volatility and not the expected consumption. He
can achieve this objective with the two instruments which are the two payment rates zsb and γsb. During
peak periods, this is no longer the case. The two payment rates are constrained by one another because
the payment rate on the volatility is a deterministic function of the payment rate on the drift. Note that
the information rent remains positive in the case (ii) even if there is only one usage. The intuition would
be that if there is only one usage, the producer can recover the effort by observing the quadratic variation
and thus enforce optimal effort on the volatility. Nevertheless, this is not enough to enforce the first–best
as the efforts on the drift remains unobservable to the producer.
4 Numerical illustration
The purpose of this section is to provide an estimate of the potential gains from the implementation of
a responsiveness incentive mechanism, both in terms of increase in consumer’s response to price events
and of benefits for the producer. We first calibrate our model with linear energy valuation and energy
generation cost on the publicly available data set of Low Carbon London Pricing Trial using the idea
that it corresponds to the implementation of an optimal contract without responsiveness incentives. All
parameters can be estimated with this strategy at the exception of the marginal costs of volatility reduction
λi. We screen the effects of a range of potential values for this last parameter, design a reference value
and proceed to robustness analysis.
4.1 Data and model calibration
The Low Carbon London Project of demand-side response (DSR) trial performed in 2012–2013 was con-
ducted at the initiative of the UK energy regulator (Ofgem) in partnership with both industrial players
and academic institutions amongst which two have to be cited for our study, Imperial College who treated
the data of the experiment and EDF Energy who acted as the energy provider and enroller for the con-
sumers. The data consists in a set of 5,567 London households whose consumption have been measured
at an half hourly time–step on the period from February 2011 to February 2014. For the dynamic Time–
of–Use (dToU) tariff trial, the population was divided in two groups. One group of approximately 1,117
households were enrolled by EDF Energy in the dToU tariff while the remaining 4,500 households were
not subject to this dynamic tariff. The dToU was applied during the year 2013 (January, 1st to December,
31st). Tariffs were sent to the households on a day–ahead basis using a Home Display or a text message
to the customer mobile phone. Prices had three levels: High (67.20 p/kWh), Normal (11.76 p/kWh) and
Low (3.99 p/kWh). Standard tariff is made of a flat tariff of 14.228 p/kWh.
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The precise description of the dToU trial performed in 2013 is given in Tindemans et al. (2014) [51,
chap. 3]. The total number of events (High and Low) were 93 to deal with supply events (shortage of
generation) and 21 for distribution network events. In our study, we are only interested in the High price
events. There were 69 such events of High prices (45 for supply reasons and 24 for network reasons). The
duration of an event could be 3, 6, 12 or 24 hours. The Low Carbon London Demand–Side Response Trial
was designed to be as close as possible to a random trial experiment, while accounting for the operational
constraints related to the enrolment of a large set of customers within the portfolio of given UK utility
(EDF Energy). The events were randomly placed over the trial period while targeting the highest peaks
of demand in the year.
The data collected by the Low Carbon London Project of demand-side response (DSR) trial performed
in 2012–2013 can be downloaded freely at London DataStore website (https://data.london.gov.uk)
under the section Smart Meter Energy Consumption Data in London Households. The demand response
trial is extensively described in a series of reports amongst which the reports Tindemans et al. (2014)
and Schofield (2014) [51, 46] are the most relevant for our study. Out of this dataset, we eliminated all
consumers for which data were not complete or exhibited outliers. The resulting sample consists in 880
consumers in the control group and 250 consumers in the dToU group.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the optimal contract is the sum of a constant term plus a term proportional
to the consumption. Thus, the optimal contract has the same form as the LCL pricing trial contract: a
fixed premium to get enrolled plus a term proportional to the consumption. This provides the rationality
for the calibration of the optimal contract without responsiveness control to the data of the LCL pricing
trial. Thus, our strategy to calibrate our model is to use Proprosition 3.3 to answer the question: what
should be the parameters value of the consumer’s behaviour model µ that would lead to the observed
consumption reduction of the LCL pricing trial? Furthermore, because our model relies on simplifying
assumption regarding the pattern of daily consumption, we fix the initial condition of the consumption to
be zero (X0 = 0), making Xt directly the observed reduction of consumption.
Duration of the price event T . In the LCL pricing trial, there were 69 High Price events for a total
of 778 half–hours. The events could last 3, 6, 12 or 24 hours. Only one exceptional event lasted a full
day (24 hours). Removing this outlier, we find an average duration of price event of 5.44 hours. We set
T = 5.5 hours.
Energy value parameters κ and θ. We have seen in Proposition 3.2 that κ should be lower than θ to
justify an average consumption reduction. Thus, we set the marginal value of electricity of the consumer
to κ = 11.76 pence/kWh, which is the price the consumer enrolled in the dToU group pays in normal
situation and we set the marginal cost of electricity generation to θ = 67.2 pence/kWh. This setting
clearly refers to a high peak demand situation when the producer has a strong interest in avoiding costly
generation.
Nominal volatility σ. As pointed in the introduction, there is significant noise in the observed reduction
of the consumers enrolled in the dToU tariff. For an average reduction of consumption of 40 W for a
consumption of magnitude of 1 kW, the estimation of the responses range between -200 W and + 200 W.
No direct estimation of the standard deviation of the reductions are reported in LCL Pricing Trial reports.
We thus performed an estimate of the volatility of the consumption of the control group during price event
using the fact that, given our model,
Var
[ 1
T
∫ T
0
Xtdt
]
=
1
3
Tσ2,
where the variance is computed under the no–effort distribution P(0,1). We estimate an average volatility
of σ = 85 W.h
1
2 .
Producer’s risk-aversion p. Let S denote the spot-price of electricity for a given hour and F the
forward price quoted the day before, one has E[e−pS ] ≈ e−p(E[S]− 12pσ2S), and by equating the certainty
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equivalent with the forward price, we obtain the risk–premium RP := F − E[S] = 12pσ2S . The risk–
premium electricity utilities are ready to pay to avoid the day–ahead spot price risk has been extensively
analysed and estimated in the financial economics literature. Bessembinder and Lemon (2002) [5] followed
by Longstaff and Wang [36], Benth et al. [4] and Viehmann (2011) [55] estimated the relation between the
risk premia on each hour of delivery and the variance of the spot price on this hour. They find consistent
and convergent estimation both on the sign of the risk premia (negative for off–peak hours and positive for
peak hours). If one focuses on the peakest hour of the day (typically 7 or 8pm), the former authors find
that dependance of the risk–premium with respect to the variance of the spot price is 0.31 for Viehmann
(2011) (Table 5, hour 20), which makes p = 0.62; Benth et al. (2008) estimates that p is no lower than
0.421 (page 14); Longstaff and Wang (2004) find a dependence of the risk–premium to the variance of the
spot price of 0.29 (page 1895, Table VI, hour 20), which makes p = 0.58. Bessembinder and Lemon (2002)
estimates risk-premia not for day-ahead spot price risk but for monthly prices, which is less relevant in
our context. Thus, we take as a nominal value for the risk–aversion parameter of the producer p = 0.6
per pound.
Consumer’s risk-aversion r. There is a large and not necessarily consensual economic literature on
the relevant estimation of consumer’s risk-aversion parameters, in particular when using CARA utility
function (see Gollier (2004) monography [19]). Nevertheless, in the context of the LCL Pricing trial, the
consumers were facing a small variation of their electricity bill which is itself a fraction of their expenses,
making the approximation of independence of decision with respect to wealth sustainable. Further, it
is possible to provide an estimate of the risk–aversion parameter r of the population who accepted to
enrol in the dynamic ToU. Indeed, the enrolled consumers were paid 100 £ at the beginning of the trial
and 50 £ more if they completed all the trial. Besides, we estimate the financial risk taken by consumers
adopting dynamic ToU tariff. We computed for each consumer of the control group the electricity bill with
the two possible tariffs, the standard flat tariff and the dynamic ToU tariff. We found that the consumers
were facing a risk with a statistically significant standard-deviation of 23 £ at the 5% level. Using the
relation between the risk-premium (150 £) and the risk level (23 £) in the relation giving the certainty
equivalent of a risk of known standard deviation for an exponential utility function, we estimated an
absolute risk–aversion r = 0.56 per pound, which is very close to the producer’s risk aversion parameter.
Consumption variation cost h. This parameter is related to the flexibility of the producer’s generation
capacities. The higher the flexibility of the generation, the lower the variance of consumption induces
costs. With the development of intermittent energy sources, the quantification of the flexibility of a given
power system has attracted the attention of researchers. For a review of this topic, we refer to Hirth
(2015) [23]. The value for h depends on the whole electric system, and not only on the capacity of a single
power plant. There is a difference of flexiblity between the electric system of Norway which relies only on
hydraulic generation and an electric system based on wind generation and coal–fired plants. Nevertheless,
if we focus on peak period of the day where flexibility is provided by gas–fired plants, we can make use of
the estimations that exist for the cost of flexibility provided by power plants (see Kumar et al. (2012) [32]
and Oxera (2003) [42], Table 3.2 p. 8 and Van den Bergh and Delarue (2015) [54], Table IV). Estimates
find consistent values of order of magnitude of 25 to 42 e/MW2.h for gas fired plants, which is in general
the technology used in peaking period of the day. Thus, we choose a nominal value of h = 40 e/MW2.h
to consider a not so flexible system in which there may be room for flexibility exchange.
Costs of effort on average consumption µ. Because we do not have access to data at the usage level,
we consider a single average usage. In order to fix an estimate of µ, we interpret the LCL experiment
as the implementation of our demand–side model when there is no control of responsiveness or volatility
(see Proposition 3.3). The conclusion of Schofield et. al. (2014) provides an estimate for the realised
average consumption reduction of 40 W. According to Proposition 3.3, the absolute value of the average
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consumption deviation is given by:
1
T
∣∣∣E[ ∫ T
0
Xtdt
]∣∣∣ = 1
3
Λµ¯|δ|T 2.
Recalling that T = 5.5, we obtain the value µ¯ = 9.3 10−5.With this value of the parameter µ, the reduction
of 40 W is obtained at the expense of a cost for the consumer given by∫ T
0
ĉ1(zt)dt =
1
6
µ¯Λ2δ2T 3 = 4.7 pence.
Costs of effort on consumption volatility λ. We recall that higher values of λ correspond to lower
costs of effort for responsiveness. Because we have no way to calibrate on data a possible value for this
parameter, we observe the total cost of volatility reduction as a function of λ and compare it to the total
cost of average consumption reduction. Figure 2 (Left) shows the numerical estimation of the total cost of
volatility reduction and the total cost of average consumption reduction as a function of λ with all other
parameters fixed at the values above. For low values of λ, the corresponding consumer’s effort is too costly
and thus, the resulting cost is zero (no effort). Then, as λ increases, the consumer starts marking efforts
to be more responsive. When λ becomes large, the total cost of volatility reduction starts to decrease.
We note that in this setting, the cost of volatilty reduction is one order of magnitude lower than the cost
for the average consumption reduction. Because we are interested in the question of what would happen,
if the consumer accepts to sign contracts indexed on his responsiveness, we take as a reference value for
λ the value that corresponds to the maximum of total cost of efforts. This choice corresponds to a worst
case scenario for the consumer in terms of costs. It does not correspond to a maximum volatility reduction
as Figure 2 (Right) demonstrates. We find a value of λ = 2.8 10−2.
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Figure 2: (Left) Total costs of effort for average consumption reduction (left axis) and for volatility
reduction (right axis). Values in pence. (Right) Total volatility and average consumption reduction in
Watt.
We summarise in Table 1 below the reference case for the calibration of our model.
4.2 Responsiveness incentive estimated benefit
Before we examine the potential benefits of the implementation of a responsiveness incentive mechanism
such as the one proposed by our model, we show on Figure 3 the different energy and volatility prices
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T h δ p r σ µ λ
(h) (p/kW2h) (p/kWh) (p−1) (p−1) (W/h1/2) (kW2h−1p−1) (p−1kW2h)
5.5 4.0 10−4 −55.44 0.6 10−2 0.57 10−2 85 9.3 10−5 2.8 10−2
Table 1: Nominal values for model parameters.
defined in Section 2. The second–best price of energy without responsiveness incentives is significantly
different from the first–best and also from the marginal cost of energy. The incentive for responsiveness
leads to a non–constant price of energy. It lies between the marginal cost of energy and the second–best
price without responsiveness incenticve. Further, it is higher at the beginning of the price event to trigger
a quick response of the consumer. The price for volatility follows the same pattern of decreasing value.
Note that it significantly different from the first–best price of volatility, which is here piefb = h
p
r+p =
2 10−3 pence/kW2.
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Figure 3: Prices for energy (left) and volatility (right).
Table 2 provides the consequences in terms of costs of efforts for the consumers and benefits for the
producer of the calibration of our model with the nominal parameters value summarised in Table 1 and
variants for the parameter λ.
Because in the second–best with responsiveness incentive, the payment rate zsb(t) also depends on λ,
the cost of average energy reduction raises from 4.68 pence when there is no responsiveness incentive to
5.97 pence when there is one. This increase is explained by the increase in average consumption reduction.
Without responsiveness incentive, the average consumption is 40 Watt as given by the calibration of the
model. The incentive to reduce volatility leads to an average reduction of 45 Watt. This increase in
average reduction explains most of the increase of the efforts performed by the consumer. The cost of
effort for the reduction represents only ten percent of the cost for average consumption reduction. The
increase in efforts of the consumer is almost all converted into benefit for the producer. The producer is
able to increase her certainty equivalent by 15% when implementing responsiveness control and to divide
by two the consumption volatility. The first–best indicates that the socially optimal strategy would be to
reduce less the volatility and more the average consumption. Besides, in this nominal situation, the best
the producer could hope to achieve is to increase her certainty equivalent by 25%.
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First–best Second–best Second–best
with without
responsiveness responsiveness
Cost of effort c1 5.97 5.97 4.68
Cost of effort c2 0.40 0.59 0
Total cost of effort 6.37 6.56 4.68
Producer’s benefit 6.76 6.21 5.40
Average consumption reduction 52.15 45.17 40.00
Standard deviation of reduction 46.49 39.61 85.06
Table 2: Costs in pence, consumption and standard deviation in Watt.
In order to assess the sensitivity of the last results to the calibration of the model, Figure 4 (Left
and Middle) presents the sensitivity analysis of the gain from responsiveness control and the reduction of
of the volatility as functions of T and |δ| = θ − κ. The red dot in the pictures represents the nominal
situation. We considered shorter and longer price event up to 12 hours and considered situations with
lower energy value discrepancy. We observe that there is a threshold of values of energy value discrepancy
and price event duration under which no benefit should be expected from the responsiveness incentives.
The lower the energy value discrepancy, the longer the price event should be to ensure a significant benefit
of responsiveness control. The incentive on volatility needs time or a large energy value discrepancy to
show its benefits. But, on the other hand, the reduction of volatility is less prone to this dependence
on the energy value discrepency. Even modest differences can induce subtantial reduction of volatility
for a standard duration of a price event. This phenomenon is stressed in Figure 4 (Right). We vary the
parameter λ from a very low value that triggers no effort to very large values and computed the percentage
of increase in the producer’s certainty equivalent and the percentage of decrease of volatility induced by
the responsiveness incentive. The resulting pictures can be read in the following way: an increase by 40%
of the efforts of the consumer increases by 15% the certainty equivalent of the producer and reduces by
53% the volatility of consumption. Besides, whatever the increase of λ, the increase in the consumer’s
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Figure 4: (Left) Gain for the producer from responsiveness control and (Midlle) volatility reduction as a
function of the price event duration T and the absolute value of the energy value discrepancy δ; all in
percentage. (Right) Producer’s gain from responsiveness incentive and volatility reduction as a function
of the percentage of increase of the total efforts of the consumer when λ varies.
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total cost of effort stabilises at 50% and the producer’s benefit increase also reaches a limit of 30% while
the volatility reduction is limited to 75%.
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Figure 5: Total (left), fixed part (middle) and certainty equivalent of the random part (right) of the
optimal payment with responsiveness control (blue) and without (red) as a function of the price event
duration T in pence.
We conclude these numerical illustration by showing the decomposition of the payment to the consumer
between the fixed part and the random part as defined in Proposition 3.2 as a function of the duration
of the price event. Indeed, we have seen that in the second–best with responsiveness incentives the
prices of energy and volatilities are not constant. The random payment increases thus more rapidly than
the payment without responsiveness incentive. Figure 5 shows the total payment and its decomposition
between its fixed part and the certainty equivalent of the random part as a function of the duration of the
price event T with and without responsiveness control. In both cases, the total payment is positive and
increases when the duration of the effort becomes large. As expected, the payment with responsiveness
control is larger than without it because it requires more efforts from the consumer. The remarkable
result comes from the decomposition of the contract between its deterministic part and its random part.
The producer charges more the consumer when implementing responsiveness incentive than without, but
provides higher certainty equivalent. The implementation of sound response from the consumer starts by
charging him a lot more but also by rewarding him a lot more in case of appropriate result. The longer the
consumer is asked to make an effort, the higher this difference should be. We cannot resist the temptation
of making this result a general principle: if one wants to induce regular results from an agent on a long
term basis, one should first reduce his income compared to his peers but then, pay him much more in case
of success.
4.3 Robustness analysis
We check in this section the robustness of the hypothesis of a linear value of energy. For the sake of
simplicity, we concentrate on the effect of a decreasing marginal value of energy for the consumer and
leave aside its counterpart on the generation side (increasing marginal cost of generation). We consider
now the following specification of the function f :
f(x) = κ
1− e−k1x
k1
, (4.1)
so that, for small values of κ1, we recover the linear case with f(x) ≈ κx.
Further, we calibrated our model for a single average usage. But, in the case of a single usage, the
producer can identify the effort on the responsiveness and thus, be close to the first–best. This is no
longer the case when there are more usages. Thus, we assess also the mean payment and the benefit of the
21
contract for the producer in the context of two and four usages. In this case we split the parameters µ, λ
and σ of the nominal situation provided by Table 1 with the vector of weight (1/4 3/4) for the two–usage
case and (1/8 1/8 1/2 1/4) for the four–usage case. The choice of the vector of weight is guided by the
idea of making a contrasted difference between usages.
We compute the numerical solution of the PDE of the second–best optimal contract with responsiveness
incentive and non–linear energy value and generation given in Proposition A.4 (i). The PDE was solved
using a standard finite difference method together with an implicit–Euler scheme. We compare in Figure 6
the resulting producer’s certainty equivalent benefit with the one obtained when sending to the consumer
the second–best contract with the linear approximation of the energy value function (4.1) and given by
Proposition 3.2 (i). In both cases, the initial condition of the contract is given by the reservation utility of
the consumer given by Proposition A.1 with f being given by relation (4.1). Thus, Figure 6 just measures
the benefit loss issued from the linear approximation of the energy value function. Without surprise,
we oberve that the more the concavity of the energy value function, the more the linear approximation
induces a loss of benefit for the producer. In the case of one usage only, a five fold multiplication of the
concavity of f leads to a loss of 1 pence out of 4. The introduction of more usages has two effects: a
general decrease of benefit independent of the linearisation and an effect induced by this approximation.
The linear approximation of concavity can reduce by half the benefit of the producer.
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Figure 6: Producer certainty equivalent benefit with one (Left), two (Middle) and four (Right) usages
with the linear approximation of f (blue continuous line) and with the non-linear f (red dotted line).
Figure 7 shows the total volatilities oberved under the second–best optimal contract with the linear
approximation of f compared to its true value. We observe that convavity increases the gap between
the reduction of volatility that could be obtained with the nonlinear energy value function and its linear
approximation. Nevertheless, the second–best contract with the linear approximation of f still succeeds
in achieving a significant decrease of the volatility before contracting, even with an increasing number of
usages.
Figure 8 presents the certainty equivalent benefit of the producer in the case of the implementation of
the linear contract with responsiveness and without responsiveness as a function of the concavity of the
energy value function of the consumer. Thus, this figure gives the loss induced not by the linearisation
of the contract, but by the absence of responsiveness incentives in the linearisation of the energy value
function. First, taking into account multiple usages reduces the difference of effects between the two
contracts because of a degradation of the performance of the contract with responsiveness incentives.
Second, as the concavity increases, the difference of benefits increase making the implementation of a
responsiveness incentive mechanism more profitable.
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Figure 7: Volatilities (Watt) with one (Left), two (Middle) and four (Right) usages with the linear ap-
proximation of f (blue dots) and with the non-linear f (red stars). Black dotted line gives the volatility
of the consumption without contract.
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Figure 8: Certainty equivalent of the producer’s benefit with the linear approximation contract with one
(Left), two (Middle) and four (Right) usages with responsiveness incentive (red dotted line) and without
responsiveness incentive (blue continuous line).
4.4 Practical issue
We have seen in the preceeding section that the optimal contract to induce an increase in the responsiveness
of consumers to price signal should be written on the quadratic variation of the consumption. In discrete
time 0 = t0 < t1 · · · tn = T , the quadratic variation 〈X〉T can be approximated by
〈X〉T ≈
n−1∑
i=0
(
Xti+1 −Xti
)2
.
Regarding energy consumption, households make a clear connection between the fact that they reduce
the heating of the house and the reduction of their consumption. But, it is not obvious that domesic
consumers first would understand why they should be charged a price proportional to that quantity and
second, how the different actions they take during the day are related to it. The genuine form of the
contract might not be acceptable for consumers. It is necessary to make simplifications to increase its
potential acceptability.
A way one could think of is to index on the event–per–event variations of the average consumption. On
event k, the producer measure the quantity X¯k :=
∫ T
0 Xtdt and charges the consumer a cost proportional
to the quantity Vk := |X¯k −Xc| where Xc is a contractualised targeted consumption in the spirit of Chao
(2011) [11]. This contract is clearly sub–optimal: we lose the fact that the incentive price for responsiveness
should be higher in the beginning of the price event, we loose the fact that the contract should be written
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on the quadratic variation, and not on the L1–norm and so on. But, we gain a simple way to provide
incentives to the consumer to remain as close as possible to a given pattern of consumption. The quantity
Vk is measured in kWh and can be understood to be charged at a price measured in e/kWh just as the
energy.
5 Conclusion
We presented in this paper a new point of view on the demand response contract using the moral hazard
problem in Principal–Agent framework, and showed how it makes it possible to reduce the average con-
sumption, while improving the responsiveness of the consumer. We provided a closed–form expression for
the optimal contract in the case of constant marginal cost and value of energy. We showed that the optimal
contract has a rebate form and that the prices for energy and volatility differs from their marginal cost
or value. We also showed how the optimal contract allows the system to bear more risk. The calibration
of our model to pricing trial data predicts that the cost of efforts of the consumer to reduce his average
consumption will lead to significant benefits for producers and significant increase in the responsiveness
of consumers and thus, on the efficiency of demand response programs. These predictions are testable. If
our claim is true, the indexing of the payment to consumer on their regularity of consumption across price
events should deeply enhance the efficiency of demand response programs. We do call for experiments to
test this prediction.
A Technical proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2 Consumer’s behaviour without contract
We provide first the following characterisation of the consumer’s reservation utility.
Proposition A.1. Assume that f is concave, non–decreasing, and Lipschitz. Then the following holds.
(i) The consumer reservation utility is concave in X0, and is given by R0 = −e−rE(0,X0), where the
corresponding certainty equivalent E is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation
∂tE +Hv
(
Exx − rE2x
)
+ f = 0 on [0, T )× R, and E(T, x) = 0, x ∈ R, (A.1)
with growth controlled by |E(t, x)| ≤ C(T − t)|x|, for some constant C.
(ii) Assume that the PDE (A.1) has a C1,2 solution E with growth controlled by |E(t, x)| ≤ C(T −t)|x|,
for some constant C; then the optimal effort of the consumer is defined by the feedback controls
a0 := 0 and b0j := 1 ∧
(
λj(Exx − rE2x)
)− 1
2 , j = 1, . . . , d.
Proof. (i) Since f is increasing, the consumer has no reason to make an effort on the drift of consumption
deviation, as no compensation is offered for this costly effort. However, this argument does not apply to
the effort on the volatility, due to the consumer’s risk aversion. As the consumer has constant risk aversion
utility with parameter r, her reservation utility reduces to
R0 := sup
P(0,β)∈P
EP
(0,β)
[
− e−r
∫ T
0 (f(Xt)− 12 c2(βt))dt
]
. (A.2)
The concavity of R0 in the initial data X0 is a direct consequence of the concavity of f and the convexity
of c2. By standard stochastic control theory, it follows that R0 = R(0, X0), where the function R is the
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dynamic version of the reservation utility, with final value R(T, x) = −1, and is a viscosity solution of the
corresponding HJB equation:
0 = ∂tR− rfR+ sup
b∈(0,1]d
1
2
(|σ(b)|2Rxx + rc2(b)R) = ∂tR− rfR− rRHv( Rxx−rR).
Denote by Xt,xs := x+Xs−t the shifted canonical process started from initial data (t, x). As f is Lipschitz,
notice that
R(t, x) ≥ EP0,1
[
− e−r
∫ T
t f(X
t,x
s )ds
]
≥ −EP0,1
[
er|f
′|∞
∫ T
t |Xt,xs |ds
]
≥ −EP0,1
[
er|f
′|∞((T−t)|x|+
∫ T
t |Xt,0s |dt)
]
≥ −C1er|f ′|∞(T−t)|x|,
where
C1 := EP
0,1
[
er|f
′|∞
∫ T
0 |Xt,0s |ds)
]
<∞,
since Xt,0s is a centred Gaussian random variable for all s ∈ [t, T ]. As c2 ≥ 0, we also have
R(t, x) ≤ sup
P(0,β)∈P
EP
0,β
[
− e−r
∫ T
t f(X
t,x
s )ds
]
= EP
0,1
[
− e−r
∫ T
t f(X
t,x
s )ds
]
≤ −C2e−r|f ′|∞(T−t)|x|,
where
C2 := EP
0,1
[
e−r|f
′|∞
∫ T
0 |Xt,0s |ds)
]
<∞,
by the same argument as previously.
Then, the certainty equivalent function E, defined by R =: −e−rE , satisfies the PDE (A.1), and has
growth controlled by E(t, x) ≤ (C1 ∨ C2)(T − t)|x].
(ii) We now assume that the PDE (A.1) has a C1,2 solution E with growth controlled by |E(t, x)| ≤
C(T − t)|x|. Then Rˆ := −e−rE is also C1,2([0, T ] × R). Denote Kβt := e−r
∫ t
0 (f(Xs)− 12 c2(βs))ds, and
Tn := inf{t > 0 : |Xt −X0| ≥ n}, we compute by Itô’s formula that for all P(0,β) ∈ P,
Rˆ(0, X0) = EP
0,β
[
KβTnRˆ(Tn, XTn)−
∫ Tn
0
Kβt
(
∂tRˆ+
1
2
|σ(βt)|2vxx − r
(
f − 1
2
c2(βt)
)
Rˆ
)
(t,Xt)dt
]
≥ EP0,β
[
KβTnRˆ(Tn, XTn)
]
−→ EP0,β
[
KβT Rˆ(T,XT )
]
= EP
0,β
[
−KβT
]
,
where the local martingale part verifies that EP0,β
[ ∫ Tn
0 K
β
t Rˆx(t,Xt)σ(βt)dWt
]
= 0, by the fact that Rˆx
is bounded on [0, Tn] and σ(β) is bounded. The second inequality follows from the PDE satisfied by Rˆ,
and the last limit is obtained by using the control on the growth of R together with the final condition
Rˆ(T, .) = −1. By the arbitrariness of P(0,β) ∈ P, this implies that Rˆ(0, X0) ≥ R0.
To prove equality, we now observe from Proposition 2.1 that by choosing b0(t, x) := b̂(Exx −E2x)(t, x)
as defined in Proposition 2.1, the (unique) inequality in the previous calculation is turned into an equality
provided that the stochastic differential equation dXt = σ(b(t,Xt))dWt has a weak solution. This, in
turn, is implied by the fact that the function σ ◦ b is bounded and continuous, see Karatzas and Shreve
[31, Theorem 5.4.22 and Remark 5.4.23]. Consequently, Rˆ(0, X0) = R0, and (a0, b0) are optimal feedback
controls.
We now prove the proposition.
Proposition A.2. (Consumer’s behaviour without contract) Let f(x) = κx, x ∈ R, for some κ ≥ 0.
Then, VA(0) = UA(κX0T + E0(T )) where
E0(T ) :=
∫ T
0
Hv
(− γ(t))dt, and γ(t) := −rκ2(T − t)2.
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The consumer’s optimal effort on the drift and on each volatility usage are respectively
a0 = 0, and b0j (t) := ε ∨ (1 ∧
(
λj |γ(t)|
)− 1
2 ), j = 1, . . . , d,
thus inducing an optimal distribution P0 under which the deviation process follows the dynamics dXt =
σ̂
(
b0(t)
) · dWt, for some P0−Brownian motion W .
Proof. The value V A(0) is concave in X0, and is given by VA(0) = −e−rE(0,X0), where the corresponding
certainty equivalent E is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation
−∂tE = f +Hv
(
Exx − rE2x
)
on [0, T )× R, and E(T, x) = 0, x ∈ R.
By directly plugging the guess E(t, x) = C(t)x+ E0(t) in the PDE (A.1), we obtain
C ′(t)x+ E′0(t) +Hv
(− rC2(t))+ κx = 0, with C(T ) = E0(T ) = 0.
This entails C(t) = κ(T − t) and E0(t) =
∫ T
t Hv
( − rC2(s))ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Finally the expression of the
maximiser b0 follows from Proposition 2.1. Since this smooth solution of the PDE has the appropriate
linear growth, we conclude from Proposition A.1 (ii) that it is indeed the value function inducing VA(0).

A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1 First–best contract
We provide here the solution of the first–best problem (2.6) corresponding to the case where the producer
chooses both the contract ξ and the level of effort of the consumer ν, under the constraint that the
consumer’s satisfaction is above the reservation utility. Introducing a Lagrange multiplier ` ≥ 0 to penalise
the participation constraint, and applying the classical Karush–Kuhn–Tucker method, we can formulate
the producer’s first–best problem as
V fb = inf
`≥0
{
− `R+ sup
(ξ,Pν)
EP
ν [
U
(− ξ −KνT )+ `UA(ξ +GνT )]}, (A.3)
where GνT :=
∫ T
0 g(Xs)ds+
h
2 〈X〉T and KνT :=
∫ T
0 (f(Xs)− c(νs))ds. The first–order conditions in ξ are
−U ′(− ξ` − GνT )+ `U ′A(ξ` +KνT ) = 0.
In view of our specification of the utility functions, this provides the optimal contract payment for a given
Lagrange multiplier `
ξ` :=
1
p+ r
ln
(
r`
p
)
− p
p+ r
GνT −
r
p+ r
KνT . (A.4)
Substituting this expression in (A.3), we see that the Principal’s first–best problem reduces to
V fb = inf
`≥0
{
`
(
−R+
(
1 +
r
p
)(
r`
p
) −r
r+p
V¯
)}
, with V¯ := sup
Pν
EP
ν
[
− e−ρ
( ∫ T
0 ((f−g)(Xt)−c(νt))dt−h2 〈X〉T
)]
,
and 1ρ :=
1
r +
1
p . Notice that V¯ does not depend on the Lagrange multiplier `. Then direct calculations
lead to the optimal Lagrange multiplier and first–best value function
`? :=
p
r
(
V¯
R
)1+ p
r
, so that V fb = R
(
V¯
R
)1+ p
r
. (A.5)
This lead to the following proposition.
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Proposition A.3. Assume that f − g is Lipschitz continuous.Then
(i) V¯ = −e−ρv¯(0,X0), where v¯ has growth |v¯(t, x)| ≤ C(T−t)|x|, for some constant C > 0, and is a viscosity
solution of the PDE
− ∂tv¯ = (f − g) +Hm(v¯x) +Hv
(
v¯xx − ρv¯2x − h
)
, on [0, T )× R, and v¯(T, .) = 0, (A.6)
so that, by (A.5), the first–best value function V fb = U(v¯(0, X0)− L0).
(ii) If in addition v¯ is smooth, the optimal efforts to induce a reduction of the consumption deviation and
of its volatility are given by
afb(t,Xt) := â
(
zfb(t,Xt)
)
, and bfb(t,Xt) := b̂
(
γfb(t,Xt)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ], (A.7)
where
zfb(t, x) := v¯x(t, x), γfb(t, x) := v¯xx(t, x)− ρv¯2x(t, x)− h, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
(iii) Denoting νfb := (afb, bfb), the optimal first–best contract can be written as
ξfb = L0 − p
p+ r
v¯(0, X0)− r
p+ r
∫ T
0
(
f(Xt)− c(νfb(t,Xt))
)
dt− p
p+ r
∫ T
0
g(Xt)dt+
h
2
〈X〉T .
Proof. By standard stochastic control theory, V¯ can be characterised by means of the corresponding
HJB equation
∂tV¯ − ρ(f − g)V¯ + sup
a∈Rd+
{− a · 1V¯x + ρc1(a)V¯ }+ 1
2
sup
b∈[0,1)d
{|σ(b)|2(V¯xx + ρhV¯ ) + ρc2(b)} = 0
V¯ (T, .) = −1.
Setting V¯ (t, x) = −e−ρv¯(t,x), we obtain by direct substitution the PDE satisfied by v¯−∂tv¯ = (f − g)− infa
{
a · 1v¯x + c1(a)
}− 1
2
inf
b
{
c2(b)− |σ(b)|2
(
v¯xx − ρv¯2x − h
)}
v¯(T, x) = 0,
(A.8)
which coincides with the PDE in the proposition statement, by definition of the consumer’s Hamiltonian
(2.8). We next prove the control on the growth of v. First, as the cost function c is non-negative, we have
V¯ ≤ sup
Pν
EP
ν
[
− e−ρ(
∫ T
0 (f−g)(Xt)dt)
]
≤ sup
Pν
EP
ν
[
− e−ρ((f−g)(X0)+|f ′−g′|∞
∫ T
0 |Xt|dt)
]
< −∞.
On the other hand, as the cost of no-effort c(0, 1) = 0, it follows that
V¯ ≥ EP0,1
[
− e−ρ(
∫ T
0 (f−g)(Xt)dt)
]
≥ sup
Pν
EP
ν
[
− e−ρ((f−g)(X0)−|f ′−g′|∞
∫ T
0 |Xt|dt)
]
> −∞.
This shows that eC1T |X0| ≤ V¯ ≤ eC2T |X0|, for some constants C1, C2 > 0, and therefore |E(0, X0)| ≤
(C1 ∨ C2)|x|T . By homogeneity of the problem, we deduce the announced control on growth by simply
removing the time origin to any t < T .
Under smoothness assumptions, we follow the line of the verification argument of the proof of Proposi-
tion A.1 to prove that the optimal consumer’s response derived in Proposition 2.1 is an optimal feedback
control for the problem V¯ . Using the fact that V fb = R0
(
1
R0
e−ρ(v¯(0,X0))
) p+r
r and L0 = −1r log(−R0), one
gets
V fb = −e−p(v¯(0,X0)−L0).
Finally, the expression of ξfb follows by direct substitution of the optimal Lagrange multiplier (A.5) in
(A.4).
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In the case when (f − g)x = δx, we make the guess that v¯(t, x) = δ(T − t)x+ ∫ t0 m¯(s)ds satisfies the
PDE (A.11) where
m¯(t) = Hm(δ(T − t)) +Hv(−h− ρδ2(T − t)2).
The value function v¯ satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition A.3 and the PDE (A.11). Rearranging the
terms in the expression of the first–best contract (iii) of Proposition A.3 leads to the form of the contract
in Proposition 3.1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2 Second–best contract
As the volatility induced by responsiveness effort is uniformly bounded above zero, and the level reduction
effort is bounded, we may follow the general methodology of Cvitanić et al. (2018) [15], based on Sannikov
(2008) [45]. Let V be the collection of all pair processes (Z,Γ) and constants y0 ∈ R, inducing the subclass
of contracts ξ = Y y0,Z,ΓT , where
Y y0,Z,Γt := y0 +
∫ t
0
ZsdXs +
1
2
∫ t
0
(
Γs + rZ
2
s
)
d〈X〉s −
∫ t
0
(
H(Zs,Γs) + f(Xs)
)
ds, t ∈ [0, T ]. (A.9)
We recall from Cvitanić et al. (2018) that UA
(
Y y0,Z,Γt
)
represents the Agent’s continuation utility so
that Y y0,Z,Γt is the time t value of the Agent’s certainty equivalent. This contract is affine in the level of
consumption deviation X and the corresponding quadratic variation 〈X〉, with linearity coefficients Z and
Γ. The constant part
∫ T
0 (H(Zs,Γs) + f(Xs))ds represents the certainty equivalent of the utility gain of
the consumer that can be achieved by an optimal response to the contract, and is thus subtracted from
the Principal’s payment, in agreement with usual Principal–Agent moral hazard type of contract (see [34,
Chapter 4]). Further, in the present setting, the risk aversion of the Agent implies that the infinitesi-
mal payment ZtdXt must be compensated by the additional payment 12rZ
2
t d〈X〉t, so that, formally, the
resulting impact of the payment ZtdXt on the Agent’s expected utility is
− exp
(
− r
(
ZtdXt +
1
2
rZ2t d〈X〉t
))
+ 1 ∼ −1 + r
(
ZtdXt +
1
2
rZ2t d〈X〉t
)
− 1
2
r2Z2t d〈X〉t + 1 ∼ rZtdXt.
Under the optimal response of the consumer, the dynamics of the consumption deviation and the certainty
equivalent of the consumer are given by
XZ,Γt := X0 −
∫ t
0
â(Zs) · 1ds+
∫ t
0
σ̂(Γs) · dWs
Y Y0,Z,Γt = Y0 +
∫ t
0
(
c
(
â(Zs), b̂(Γs)
)− f(XZ,Γs ) + 12rZ2s |σ̂(Γs)|2)ds+
∫ t
0
Zsσ̂(Γs) · dWs,
so that the average rate of payment consists in paying back the consumer her costs minus benefit c−f , and
an additional compensation for the risk taken by the consumer for bearing the volatility of consumption
deviation. Note that the average rate of payment can be positive or negative.
Remark A.1. (i) Assume that the producer proposes the contract ξ0 defined by y0 = −1r ln(−R0),
Z = Γ ≡ 0, i.e. ξ0 = −1r ln(−R0) −
∫ T
0 f(X
ν
t )dt, as the Hamiltonian satisfies here Hv(0) ≡ 0. Then, the
optimal response of the consumer is obtained by solving the utility maximisation problem
VA(ξ
0) = sup
Pν∈P
E
[
UA
(
−
∫ T
0
c(νt)dt
)]
.
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As the cost function c is non–decreasing in the effort, at the optimum, the consumer makes no effort,
neither on the drift, nor on the volatility. Comparing with Proposition A.1, this shows that the absence
of contract is different from the above contract ξ0, with zero payment rates.
(ii) We may also examine the case where the producer offers a contract with payment ξ = 0 to the
consumer. This is achieved by choosing Zt = Ex(t,Xt) and Γt = (Exx − E2x)(t,Xt), where the certainty
equivalent reservation E is defined in Proposition A.1. From the point of view of the consumer, such
a contract is clearly equivalent to the no contracting setting, and thus induces a positive effort on the
volatility in the consumer’s optimal response.
By the main result of Cvitanić et al. (2018), we may reduce the Principal’s problem to the optimisation
over the class of contracts Y y0,Z,ΓT , where y0 ≥ L0 and (Z,Γ) ∈ V. By the obvious monotonicity in y0, this
leads to the following standard stochastic control problem
V sb = sup
Z,Γ
E
[
U
(− LZ,ΓT )], with LZ,Γt := Y Z,Γt + ∫ t
0
g
(
XZ,Γs
)
ds+
h
2
d〈XZ,Γ〉s, t ∈ [0, T ],
and starting point y0 = L0. The state variable L represents the loss of the producer under the optimal
response of the consumer, and is defined by the dynamics
dLZ,Γt =
1
2
(
2(g − f)(XZ,Γt ) + ĉ1(Zt) + f0(rZ2t + h,Γt)
)
dt+ Ztσ̂(Γt) · dWt, t ∈ [0, T ).
where
f0(q, γ) := q
∣∣σ̂(γ)∣∣2 + ĉ2(γ). (A.10)
The function f0(q, γ) measures the total cost the producer incurs from the volatility, when the unit cost
of volatility is q and the rate of payment for the volatility reduction is γ. The term q|σ̂(γ)|2 is the
instantaneous cost of volatility while the term ĉ2(γ) is the cost of effort incurred by the consumer. This
last cost will be paid by the producer, and enters thus in the evaluation of the cost of volatility. The
producer aims at making the term |σ̂(γ)|2 as small as possible. To achieve this objective, a sufficiently
large γ should be paid to reduce |σ̂(γ)|2, but this can be done only at the expense of an increasing cost
ĉ2(γ).
Lemma A.1. Let F0(q) := infγ≤0 f0(q, γ). Then F0(q) = f0(q,−q) = −2Hv(−q) is non–decreasing.
Proof: Recall that f0(q, γ) = q
∣∣σ̂(γ)∣∣2 + ĉ2(γ) where
ĉ2(γ) =
d∑
j=1
σ2j
λj
(
b̂j(γ)
−1 − 1
)
,
∣∣σ̂(γ)∣∣2 = d∑
j=1
σ2j b̂j(γ) and b̂j(γ) := 1 ∧ (λjγ−)−
1
2 ∨ ε.
If λjγ− ≤ 1 then b̂j(γ) = 1 and thus b̂′j(γ) = 0. Similarly, if λjγ− ≥ ε−(1+1), then b̂j(γ) = ε and thus
b̂′j(γ) = 0. Finally, if ε
−(1+1) > λjγ− > 1 then b̂j(γ) = (−λiγ)− 12 and thus
b̂′j(γ) =
1
2
λ
− 1
2
j (−γ)−
1
2
−1 = − 1
2γ
b̂j(γ).
Define now
fj(γ) :=
σ2j
λj
(
b̂j(γ)
−1 − 1)+ qσ2j b̂j(γ).
We have
f ′j(γ) =
σ2j
λj
(
− b̂j(γ)−2b̂′j(γ)
)
+ qσ2j b̂
′
j(γ).
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If −ε−(1+1) < λjγ < −1, one has b̂j(γ)−2 = −λjγ and thus
f ′j(γ) = σ
2
j
(
γ + q)̂b′j(γ) = −
(
1 +
q
γ
)σ2j
2
b̂j(γ)1{−ε−2<λjγ<−1}.
Hence
∂f0
∂γ
(q, γ) = −
(
1 +
q
γ
) d∑
i=1
σ2i
2
b̂i(γ)1{−ε−2<λiγ<−1}.
Therefore, the minimum of f0(q, γ) over negative γ is reached either at γ = −q when there is at least one
index i ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that q ∈ [1/λi, ε−2/λi], and otherwise f0 does not depend on q. Hence, we can
consider that the minimiser is always γ = −q, and thus F0(q) = f0(q,−q).
Direct computations now show that
fj(−q) =
σ2j
λj
(
1{λjq≤1}λjq + 1{ε−2>λjq>1}
(
2(λjq)
1
2 − 1
)
+ 1{ε−2≤λjq}
(
λjεq + ε
−1 − 1
))
,
so that by adding all the terms
F0(q) =
d∑
j=1
σ2j
λj
(
1{λjq≤1}λjq + 1{ε−2>λjq>1}
(
2(λjq)
1
2 − 1
)
+ 1{ε−2≤λjq}
(
λjεq + ε
−1 − 1
))
,
from which it is clear that F0 is non–decreasing. 
The value function of the second–best problem can be characterised as follows.
Proposition A.4 (Second–best contract). Assume that f − g is Lipschitz continuous. Then
(i) V sb = −e−p(v(0,X0)−L0) where v has growth |v(t, x)| ≤ C(T − t)|x|, for some constant C > 0, and is a
viscosity solution of the PDE−∂tv = f − g +
1
2
µ¯ v2x −
1
2
inf
z∈R
{
F0
(
q(vx, vxx, z)
)
+ µ¯
(
(z− + vx)2 + ηA(vx, z)
)}
, on [0, T )× R,
v(T, .) = 0,
(A.11)
with q(vx, vxx, z) := h− vxx + rz2 + p(z− vx)2, and ηA(vx, z) := (vx + (z−−A)+)2− v2x −→ 0, as A↗∞.
(ii) If in addition v is smooth, the optimal payment rate γsb to incentivise the agent responsiveness is
γsb(t,Xt) := −h+ vxx(t,Xt)− rz2sb(t,Xt)− p
(
zsb(t,Xt)− vx(t,Xt)
)2
, t ∈ [0, T ], (A.12)
and the optimal payment rate for the consumption deviation reduction is the minimiser zsb in (A.11),
satisfying for large A:
zsb ∈
(
vx,
p
r + p
vx
)
, when vx ≤ 0, and zsb = p
r + p
vx, when vx ≥ 0.
(iii) The second–best optimal contract is given by
ξsb :=
− log (−R)
r
+
∫ T
0
zsb(t,Xt)dXt +
1
2
(γsb + rz
2
sb)(t,Xt)d〈X〉t −
(
H(zsb, γsb) + f
)
(t,Xt)dt.
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Remark A.2. (i) Consider the case of a risk–neutral consumer r = 0. As F0 is non–decreasing by Lemma
A.1, we see that the minimum in the PDE (A.11) is attained at zsb = vx, thus reducing the PDE (A.11)
to
−∂tv − (f − g)− 1
2
µ¯
(
v−x
)2
= −1
2
F0(h− vxx) = Hv(vxx − h),
where the last equality follows from Lemma A.1. Notice that this is the same PDE as the first–best
characterisation given in Proposition A.3 (i), since ρ = 0 in the present setting.
In particular, the producer’s value function is independent of her risk–aversion parameter p. The
optimal payment rates for the effort on the drift and the volatility are given by zsb = vx and γsb = −h+vxx,
so that the resulting optimal contract is also independent of the producer’s risk–aversion p. This is
consistent with the findings of Hölmstrom and Milgrom [27] in the context of a risk–neutral agent, where
the optimal effort of the Agent is independent of the Principal risk aversion parameter.
Proof. By standard stochastic control theory, the dynamic version of the value function of the Principal,
denoted by V (t, x, `) := V sb(t, x, `), is a viscosity solution, with appropriate growth at infinity, of the
corresponding HJB equation
−∂tV = (g−f)V`+ 1
2
sup
(z,γ)∈R2
{∣∣σ̂(γ)∣∣2[(h+rz2)V`+Vxx+z2V``+2zVx`]− µ¯(2z−Vx− (z−)2V`)+ ĉ2(γ)V`},
with terminal condition V (T, x, `) = U(−`), for (x, `) ∈ R2. Under the constant relative risk aversion
specification of the utility function of the producer, it follows that
−p∂tv = p(f − g)− 1
2
inf
z,γ
{∣∣σ̂(γ)∣∣2((h+ rz2)p− pvxx + p2(vx)2 + z2p2 − 2zp2vx)
+ µ¯
(
2z−pvx + p(z−)2
)
+ pĉ2(γ)
}
,
which reduces to the PDE (A.11).
The control on the growth of the function v is deduced from the control on the growth of V by
following the same line of argument as in the proof of Proposition A.3, using the Lipschitz feature of
the difference f − g. Similarly, under smoothness condition, the same verification argument leads to the
optimal feedback controls, defined as the maximisers of the second–best producer’s Hamiltonian, which
determine the optimal payment rates.
We finally verify that the additional properties of the optimal payment rates hold. First, if vx ≥ 0, the
map z 7−→ F0
(
h− vxx + rz2 + p(z − vx)2
)
+ µ¯(z− + vx)2
}
is non–increasing for z ≤ pr+pvx because F0 is a
non–decreasing function. Thus, the minimum of the map is reached for the minimum of q(vx, vxx, z) which
is zsb = pr+pvx. Second, if vx ≤ 0, the preceding map is non–longer monotonic on the interval (vx, pr+pvx).
But, it is non–increasing for z ≤ vx and non–decreasing for z ≥ pr+pvx, making its infimum lie between vx
and pr+pvx. In both cases, the optimiser with respect to γ can be deduced from Lemma A.1, and is given
by (A.12).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3 Second best uncontrolled responsiveness
Proposition A.5 (Second–best uncontrolled responsiveness). Assume that f − g = δx. Then, V sbm =
U
(
w(0, X0)−L0
)
) where w has growth |w(t, x)| ≤ C(T − t)|x|, for some constant C > 0, and is a viscosity
solution of the PDE
−∂tw = (f−g)+ 1
2
µ¯ w2x−
1
2
inf
z∈R
{q(wx, wxx, z)|σ|2 +µ¯(z−+wx)2
}
, on [0, T )×R, and w(T, .) = 0, (A.13)
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with q(wx, wxx, z) = h− wxx + rz2 + p(z − wx)2, and the second–best optimal contract is given by
ξ0sb =
− log (−R)
r
+ ΛδX0 +
1
2
∫ T
0
rz2sb(t)|σ|2dt−
∫ T
0
Hm(zsb(t))dt−
∫ T
0
(κ− Λδ)Xtdt
where zsb = Λδ(T − t) with Λ := p|σ|
2+µ¯1{wx<0}
(p+r)|σ|2+µ¯1{wx<0} .
Proof. When Γ ≡ 0, we have F0(q) = q|σ|2, and the PDE of Proposition A.4 (i) reduces thus to (A.13).
The minimizer is obtained directly by writing first order conditions, and the optimal contract follows. The
form of the contract is obtained by applying integration by part to the term
∫ T
0 zsb(t)dXt of the general
form of the contract (A.9).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4 Information rent
From Proposition A.3, we have V fb = U(v¯(0, X0) + 1r log(−R)). When (f − g)(x) = δx, we have
v¯(0, X0) = δTX0 − 1
2
∫ T
0
F0(−γfb(t))dt,
because zfb(t) ≥ 0 and thus, ĉ1(zfb(t)) = 0. Further, recall from Corollary 3.1 that when δ ≥ 0, we have
V sb = U(v(0, X0) +
1
r log(−R)) with
v(0, X0) = δTX0 − 1
2
∫ T
0
F0(−γsb(t))dt.
In this case, we also have γsb = γfb. Thus, the certainty equivalent of the value function in the first–best
and in the second–best are equal, and I = 0. Further, the equality of the certainty equivalent of the
first–best and the second–best implies that the payments ξfb and ξsb are equal because the actions of the
consumer are the same in both cases.
When δ < 0 and h+ rδ2T 2 ≤ 1
λ¯
, we know that zsb(t) = Λδ(T − t), so that
inf
z∈R
{
F0
(
h+ rz2 + p(z −A(t))2)+ µ¯(z− +A(t))2} = (h+ rΛδ2(T − t)2)|σ|2,
and therefore
ψ(t) =
1
2
∫ T
t
µ¯δ2(T − t)2dt− 1
2
∫ T
0
(
h+ rΛδ2(T − t)2
)
|σ|2dt.
Hence, in this case
log
(− V sb)
p
= L0 − δTX0 − ψ(0)
= pi +
1
2
∫ T
0
(
γs
∣∣σ̂(γs)∣∣2 − ĉ2(γs)− µ¯δ2(T − s)2)ds+ 1
2
∫ T
0
(
h+ rΛδ2(T − t)2
)
|σ|2dt.
In addition, in this setting, c(νfb) = c1(afb) and −γfb = h + ρδ2(T − t)2 ≤ 1λ¯ because ρ < r, and thus
b̂j(γfb) = 1, and we have c1(afb(t)) = 12 µ¯δ
2(T − t)2. Thus we get
I =
1
2
∫ T
0
γfb(t)
∣∣σ̂(bfb(t))∣∣2dt+ 1
2
∫ T
0
(
h+ rΛδ2(T − t)2)|σ|2dt = 1
2
|σ|2(rΛ− ρ) ∫ T
0
δ2(T − t)2dt,
where we used the fact that −γfb = h+ ρδ2(T − t)2. The required expression follows.
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